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Abstract
Death qualification, the policy and process by which the American legal system
determines whether or not jurors are fit to serve on death penalty cases, functions today as an
enshrined practice in criminal law after decades of scrutiny under the lens of both the Supreme
Court and academic scholars. By tracing the evolution of the death qualification process as well
as its impacts and implications on both jury composition and verdicts, this research considers
whether death qualification merits continued utilization and protection. While this practice
emanates from a value of balancing the interests of the state with that of the accused, its
application does little to bear up such a premise. It is clear that death qualification actively
threatens the rights of capital defendants and assembles unrepresentative, conviction-prone
juries. These findings demand either a significant transformation or immediate termination of the
process of death qualification.
Introduction
Throughout American history, the utilization and deployment of the death penalty has
coursed through the veins of the lineage of our jurisprudence. In 1976, the Supreme Court
reinstated the use of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia1 sparking what would lead to a steady
surge in executions through 1999. 2 Since 2000, the total number of executions in the United
States has gradually declined, spiking at 98 executions performed in 1999 and receding to 14

“Gregg v. Georgia (1976),” Bill of Rights Institute, accessed November 7, 2020,
https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/lessons-plans/landmark-supremecourt-cases-elessons/gregg-v-georgia-1962/.
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“Death Row U.S.A. Fall 2020,” NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,
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executions in 2020 as of October 1, 2020, bringing the total number of executions enforced in the
United States since 1976 to 1,526. 3
Despite the declining overall trends in executions in the US, one jurisdiction has radically
reversed course in 2020; the federal government has scheduled and carried out seven executions
this year in July through September, totaling more than it has performed in the past sixty-five
years combined.4 Federal executions, historically rare, were only witnessed three times since
Congress reinstituted the federal death penalty in 1988, the most recent transpiring in 2003. 5
After a botched execution in the state of Oklahoma in 2014, President Barack Obama effectively
placed a moratorium on the death penalty and enacted a review of federal death penalty
procedure by the Department of Justice. 6 In July 2019, Attorney General William Barr
announced the DOJ’s review had concluded, and the federal government initiated the process of
what would become a spree of executions in 2020 for the first time in 17 years, 7 surpassing the
number of executions implemented federally in the past six and a half decades of US history. 8
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“Capital Punishment,” Federal Bureau of Prisons, accessed November 7, 2020,
https://www.bop.gov/about/history/ federal _executions.jsp.
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While this trend runs against the past two decades of states’ approaches to executions, it
also pushes a view becoming progressively more unpopular among the American public. 9 In
2016, fifty percent of Americans favored the death penalty for punishment of murder compared
to forty-five percent who preferred life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 10 Public
opinion dramatically shifted in recent years, and in 2019, Gallup found sixty percent of
Americans favor life imprisonment without parole in comparison to thirty-five percent who favor
the death penalty as the better punishment for murder.11 In over thirty-four years of asking this
question, this marks the first time a majority of Americans find life in prison without parole
preferable to the death penalty as punishment for murder.12 While Americans prefer alternative
punishment over the death penalty, in 2019, fifty-six percent of Americans approved of the death
penalty as punishment for murder, yet this number has declined gradually from eighty percent in
1994.13 In 2001, Gallup began questioning and analyzing Americans’ views on the moral
acceptability of the death penalty, and their findings from a May 2020 poll marked a record-low
number of those who find the death penalty morally acceptable. 14 Fifty-four percent of

Megan Brenan, “Record-Low 54% in U.S. Say Death Penalty Morally Acceptable,”
Gallup, June 23, 2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/312929/record-low-say-death-penalty morally-acceptable.aspx.
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10

Jeffrey Jones, “Americans Now Support Life in Prison Over Death Penalty,” Gallup,
November 25, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/268514/americans-support- life-prison-deathpenalty.aspx.
11

12

Jones, “Americans Now Support Life in Prison Over Death Penalty.”

13

“Death Penalty,” Gallup.

14

Brenan, “Record-Low 54% in U.S. Say Death Penalty Morally Acceptable.”

5
Americans view the death penalty as morally acceptable, a decline of six percent since 2019, 15
while a record-high forty percent find the practice morally wrong.16
With such division among the American public over the death penalty, the federal
government’s renewal of executions at such a pace merits serious attention. Of course, the use
and dispatch of the death penalty cannot be divorced from the US political climate and context.
Perhaps the simple fact that 2020 is an election year is the root cause for this rash of executions.
Is the current administration maneuvering this issue for political gain or power? Maybe. While
the death penalty may be statistically approaching its own passing in favorability, it is clear that
powerful forces and players are still willing to utilize its power, whether for rational, political
gain or objective values, despite significant difference of opinion within the public arena on the
issue.
Despite being a country that deeply espouses due process, the rights of criminal
defendants, and balancing the interests of an individual and the state, the singularity of the
American judicial system incontestably falters around the use of the death penalty when
examined on the international stage. While many would likely laud the legal traditions of
Western culture deeply established in the American system, scarcely any would commend the
United States for its company and rank on the world stage concerning executions. According to
Amnesty International, a human rights advocacy organization, the year 2019 marked the eleventh
consecutive year the US persisted as the exclusive executing country in the Americas. 17 In
15

“Death Penalty,” Gallup.
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“Amnesty International Global Report: Death Sentences and Executions 2019,”
Amnesty International, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5018472020
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examining total executions by country in 2019, the US ranked fifth with twenty-two executions
over the year preceded only by China (1,000s, the exact number is unknown since “this data is
classified as a state secret”), 18 Iran (251+), Saudi Arabia (184), Iraq (100+), and Egypt (32+) (the
“+” sign indicating the calculated minimum number of executions).19 Such standing with
countries that generally differ wildly with the US on human rights issues should spark concern
and attention from anyone even mildly informed on such affairs. As a country that prides itself
on its uniqueness and singularity, it is imperative we analyze how and why the US system ranks
so high in this area on the world stage alongside countries with severe human rights abuses. The
international company the US holds concerning the death penalty and executions should spark
questioning of the system and an evaluation as to whether it lives up to its original ideals and
values.
Following Gregg v. Georgia, the resurgence of executions ticking up year by year was
composed of a shocking array of techniques leading to death including lethal injection,
historically the most common method, electrocution, lethal gas, hangings, and firing squad. 20
While this research primarily revolves around the issue of death qualification and how capital
juries are constructed, the methods of execution merit significant exploration and weight in any
discussion and judgement on the employment of the death penalty. In his book, Gruesome
Spectacles: Botched Executions and America’s Death Penalty, Austin Sarat explores the tragic

“Death Penalty in 2019: Facts and Figures,” Amnesty International, accessed
November 7, 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/death-penalty-in-2019facts-and- figures/.
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errors in executions including hangings becoming slow strangulations or decapitations,
electrocutions too minimal that only stunned or too strong that burned the body and sometimes
sparked fires, gas chambers leading to harrowing strangulations, and missed veins and
complications administering lethal injections.21 Overall, Sarat found an average botched
execution rate of 3.15 percent of executions from 1900 to 2010, and lethal injection, today’s
method of choice, carries a 7.12 percent error rate.22 These horrendous errors and long history of
botched executions in the United States, despite “evolving” methods, certainly merit continued
probing and analysis. A proper understanding of the history and method by which the state
conducts the executions of its own citizens is indispensable to a judicious verdict on the moral
and legal standing of the death penalty.
While these concerns and issues raise significant challenges to the standing and use of the
death penalty, there lies yet another problem that is rooted even deeper in this process. In the
United States, death penalty sentences are primarily handed down by juries. These juries are
selected and organized by a process defined by looming biases and inevitable disparities in the
delivery of justice. This process, known as “death qualification,” has wreaked havoc on
fundamental constitutional rights, minority communities, and our sense of “justice” in the United
States.
Chapter 1: The History of the Death Qualification of Juries
While the death penalty solely in and of itself elicits visceral reactions from many, a
darker, discreet element of this practice lurks beneath a surface-level observation. To try a capital

Jon M. Sands and Dale A. Baich, “Gruesome Spectacles: Botched Executions and
America’s Death Penalty,” Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science & Technology 55, no. 4
(Summer 2015): 463–75.
21
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case, a court must impanel a group of jurors who are death-qualified. These jurors are required to
not be “strictly opposed” to the death penalty nor to hold that the death penalty ought to be
applied in all capital murder cases.23 The case precedent and rules guiding voir dire and defining
who is fit to serve on a capital murder case have evolved and emerged from several landmark
Supreme Court cases.
One of the earliest cases concerning death qualification, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968), decided whether this process aligned with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an
“impartial jury” and the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of due process. In this case, the
state of Illinois allowed jurors to be challenged for cause if they exhibited “conscientious
scruples against capital punishment” or opposed the practice.24 Under this statute, the
prosecution challenged and removed almost half of the jury pool based alone on any hesitations,
doubts, and objections toward the death penalty raised by a juror; Witherspoon was subsequently
convicted for murder and received a sentence of death.25 Witherspoon, in his appeal, argued that
his jury, in the manner assembled, was produced to convict and would be more likely to side
with the prosecution and to find a guilty verdict. 26 Justice Stewart, in writing the majority
opinion, rejected Witherspoon’s claim and social science evidence that his jury and deathqualified juries overall were more prone to convict; however, he found that this jury did not meet
the Sixth Amendment’s impartiality requirement in its composition and the ensuing decision on
Alice Chao et al, “Death-Qualified Juries and the Flowers Trials,” Cornell University
Law School, accessed November 7, 2020, https://courses2.cit.cornell.edu/sociallaw/FlowersCase
/deathqualifiedjuries.html.
23
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punishment was biased toward finding a sentence of death. 27 He ruled, “A man who opposes the
death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to
him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror.”28 The Court found that a more
narrow exclusion rule must be applied in order to produce a “neutral” jury as removing those
with “conscientious religious scruples” or general objections deprived the jury of its duty to
“express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death,” and instead,
“The State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” 29 This case
established the term, “Witherspoon-excludables,” a label for those whose opposition and views
toward the death penalty allowed them to be removed from a jury. 30 Witherspoon protected
general objectors and those with “conscientious scruples” from immediate removal on capital
juries and required only the removal of those who would “automatically” vote against a death
penalty sentence and those who could not remain impartial in determining a defendant’s guilt.
In 1985, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to another case involving death
qualification. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), further expanded the definition of jurors
who could be excluded for their death penalty viewpoints. This case, along with many others
since Witherspoon, forced the Court to reexamine the Witherspoon standard and its application
by lower courts over the exclusion of jurors.31 At issue in this case was whether or not a juror’s
bias must be proven with “unmistakable clarity” in order to exclude such a juror, a question that
27
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Justice Rehnquist answered by setting aside the Witherspoon standard.32 The Court ruled that
exclusion due to a juror’s views on the death penalty should be based upon whether their views
would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath,” the standard set forth in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980).33 Effectively, the Court “simplified” its rules and standards for juror exclusion. 34 By
replacing the narrow exclusion limited to those employing “automatic” decision-making and
broadening exclusion to all whose views would impair them from the performance of their duty
and maintaining their oath, the Court vastly increased the pool of excludable jurors. The Court
also found that biases did not have to be proven with “unmistakable clarity” but rather,
“deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror” to assess whether or not
the Adams test was met.35 Additionally, Justice Rehnquist ruled that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a
trial judge’s findings on the merits of an exclusion for cause was a “factual issue” and therefore
should be given deference and a “presumption of correctness” by a court reviewing a case
involving such an issue as held in Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).36 Under Witt, the Court
limited the discretion provided to jurors and clarified the standard for juror exclusion based on
the Adams test.37 While Witt cleared up confusion among lower courts regarding juror exclusion,
32

Wainwright v. Witt.

33

Wainwright v. Witt.

Patrick J. Callans, “Sixth Amendment--Assembling a Jury Willing to Impose the Death
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Criminology 76, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 1027–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/1143499.
34
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it largely increased the pool of jurors who could be deemed unfit to serve on capital juries and
shielded such decisions under the trial judge’s authority.
A year after Witt, the Court revisited the issue of jurors’ views on the death penalty and
death qualification in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). In this case, where the jury
convicted McCree but gave a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, McCree brought a
challenge to the use of death qualification before the guilt phase of his bifurcated trial and held
that such action violated the representative cross-section of the community and the impartial jury
requirements of the Constitution. 38 Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, found that
the exclusion of these “Witherspoon-excludables” did not violate the fair cross-section
requirement as the process was not a “systematic exclusion of ‘a distinctive group in the
community’” as described in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), and that a group defined
by shared viewpoints making them unfit to serve on a jury did not establish a “distinctive
group.”39 McCree introduced several studies attempting to show death-qualified juries were more
likely to convict and find a defendant guilty, yet the Court found this evidence too “tentative and
fragmentary” and rejected it. 40 The Court ruled that McCree’s death-qualified jury was not
biased in its finding of guilt holding that, “A jury selected from a fair cross-section of the
community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on
the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to
apply the law to the facts of the particular case.” 41 McCree stepped away from the Witherspoon
38
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standard of a least intrusive means to exclude jurors and maintain the state’s interests in creating
juries that could uphold its statutes and to avoid overbroad, unrepresentative exclusion that
would threaten a defendant’s rights, and McCree held that such exclusion was constitutional
even within the guilt phase of a trial. 42 McCree, as in cases before it, rejected social science
evidence on the effects of death qualification and allowed for the removal of “Witherspoonexcludables” prior to the guilt phase of a capital trial.
In 2007, the Court took up another case involving death qualification voir dire and the
reviewing by courts of decisions of juror exclusion and removal. In Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1
(2007), the Court ruled on whether or not an appellate court had correctly deferred to a trial
court’s finding of a juror’s impairment to serve on a capital case. 43 The Court reviewed the voir
dire process from the case and “Juror Z’s” statements and removal. 44 In the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy strongly affirmed the state’s interest in the ability to remove jurors incapable of
recommending a sentence of death, 45 and found the trial court “is entitled to deference because it
had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of Juror Z.” 46 Because the appellate court could not
observe and evaluate the juror’s behavior, demeanor, and other cues that the trial court had direct
access to and observation of, it should give deference to the trial court’s ruling. 47 The Court
Jane Byrne, “Lockhart v. McCree: Conviction Proneness and the Constitutionality of
Death-Qualified Juries Note,” Catholic University Law Review 36, no. 1 (1986): 287–318.
42
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allowed for the potential of review which would overturn a case based on finding no substantial
impairment on behalf of a juror and held, “But where, as here, there is lengthy questioning of a
prospective juror and the trial court has supervised a diligent and thoughtful voir dire, the trial
court has broad discretion.”48 By weighing a juror’s observable demeanor and actions over
statements in the trial record by the juror the Court increased the likelihood that reviewing courts
would not overturn decisions made by trial courts to exclude jurors.49 Uttecht further solidified
decisions of juror exclusion within the bounds of trial courts, increasingly sealing such
judgements from review and reconsideration from higher courts.
From Witherspoon to Uttecht, the standards and tests for death qualification have
continued to evolve and new precedents have emerged under varying eras of the Court. These
cases are not exhaustive of all of the death qualification related cases the Supreme Court has
ruled on and considered, but they do provide a timeline and foundation for understanding the
precedent and basis for where the practice stands today. The dark cloud of death qualification
continues to grow and encompass more of the American public and viewpoints under its shadow
as the Court employs broader exclusion definitions and limits review of juror removals.
Certainly, the progression and development of this storm merit attention and cause for concern
when nearly half of the population may be removed from juries due to the views they hold, no
matter how decided they are.
Another interesting, historical aspect of jury trials and juries is nullification. Jury
nullification, a controversial, long-standing practice in American jurisprudence where juries may

48
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Brooke A. Thompson, “Criminal Law - The Supreme Court Expands the Witt
Principles to Exclude a Juror Who Would Follow the Law - Uttecht v. Brown,” University of
Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 30, no. 4 (2007): 845–84.
49
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reject the rule of law by “object[ing] to the application of the law to a particular defendant or
object wholesale to the law itself.” 50 In English courts before the Magna Carta, the description,
“courts of conscience,” characterized juries who ruled on cases “according to their own sense of
justice.”51 This tradition carried on into the American legal system, most notably in cases where
juries nullified the law and refused to convict those who illegally safeguarded runaway enslaved
people.52 More recently, Butler argues that the historic injustices toward people of color at the
hands of the American legal system require that, “It is the moral responsibility of black jurors to
emancipate some guilty black outlaws.”53 He holds that jury nullification for some nonviolent
black defendants is morally, pragmatically, and politically better for black communities. 54 Others
have applied Butler’s argument for nullification to the case of Latinos as a potentially effective
counter to the racism within the immigration process and the detrimental effects of incarceration
and deportation.55 With its varied uses over centuries, many argue that jury nullification “helps
keep the law respectable by keeping it in line with the conscience of the community.” 56 When a
“Live Free and Nullify: Against Purging Capital Juries of Death Penalty Opponents,”
Harvard Law Review 127, no. 7 (2014): 2095.
50

Andrew J. Parmenter, “Nullifying the Jury: The Judicial Oligarchy Declares War on
Jury Nullification Note,” Washburn Law Journal 46, no. 2 (2006): 380.
51
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law becomes so unpopular and unacceptable within the community, it retains and can use the
power of nullification to reject what such a law demands. The link between death qualification
and jury nullification comes from the fact that, “Death-qualification of juries began as a means of
controlling independent juries.”57 Conrad argues, “Our entire edifice of capital punishment law
revolves around guiding, focusing and channeling jury discretion into judicially approved
channels”58 that we risk depriving defendants of their fundamental constitutional rights. Perhaps,
there lies a remedy for the scorching of death qualification on jury pools in the doctrine of jury
nullification.
It is clear that the process of death qualification has significantly evolved due to many
Supreme Court cases guiding its use and limitations. By exploring these cases, it is clear that this
process is deeply embedded in the American legal system, and it will likely only change as a
result of further legal cases and proceedings. Therefore it is imperative to understand the history
of the law and reasoning of the courts in order to maintain an accurate assessment of the process
and to understand what approaches could be employed, whether jury nullification, specific legal
questions, interpretations of cases, or other means, to best address the policy of death
qualification.
Chapter 2: The Impact and Outcomes of Death Qualification
Arguably more disturbing and concerning than the history and purpose of death
qualification are the repercussions from the implementation of the practice on juries. Death
qualification influences both the demographics and judgements of juries in a vast array of ways
that run contrary to the impartial jury and cross-section of the community requirements of the
Clay S. Conrad, “Jury Nullification,” Cato Institute, 2014: 222, https://www.cato.org/
sites/ cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/jury-nullification.pdf.
57
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Constitution. As death qualification continues to weed out a growing sector of the public, it
threatens the very essence of the jury system in the United States, one that relies upon
representative, unbiased jurors.
As Cohen argues, any meaningful restriction or qualification built into the jury system
erodes the basis of the impartiality of the jury; the broadening exclusionary standards of death
qualification corrode the very ideals the jury was intended to represent. 59 It remains to be seen if
the American legal system will allow its jurors to serve as checks on the law or be demoted to
mere mechanistic enforcers of rules of the state regardless of the state’s interests or aberrations.
As the system stands, such viewpoint regulation of jurors denies capital defendants a right
promised them in the Constitution whereby juries may decide whether or not “a sentence of
death is repugnant.”60 Today, the decision is arguably set from the beginning with increasingly
smaller chances of true deliberation by juries.
Over the years as death qualification has cemented itself within the courts and death
penalty procedure, many studies and extensive research has analyzed the effects and impacts of
this process both within the minds of jurors and on the results of jury composition and verdicts.
In conducting simulated trials, Cowan found that, under the Witherspoon standard, deathqualified jurors were more likely to find a guilty verdict both before and after jury deliberations
than their excludable counterparts. 61 Additionally, Cowan’s results showed that on mixed juries

G. Ben Cohen and Robert J. Smith, “The Death of Death-Qualification,” Case Western
Reserve Law Review 59, no. 1 (2008): 87–124.
59
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(juries including excludable jurors) individual jurors “were generally more critical of the
witnesses, less satisfied with their juries, and better able to remember the evidence than subjects
from the death-qualified juries, suggesting that diversity may increase the vigor, thoroughness,
and accuracy of the jury’s deliberations.”62 By stripping a jury of certain viewpoints, the odds
decrease in the defendant’s favor that they might receive true deliberation and argument over
their guilt and sentencing rather than blind acceptance of the state’s case.
The process of death qualification itself opens the door to unfounded assumptions by
jurors when discussing the death penalty leads to predispositions of guilt on behalf of the
defendant.63 Under death qualification, juries truly “tilt toward death” and are more likely to
convict,64 a frightening fact for any capital defendant and defense attorney. Not only should this
evidence plague those involved in such a rigged system, it should unsettle anyone who desires
the legal system to retain trust and legitimacy.
The process of death qualification not only removes a large percentage of the public and
their viewpoints and experiences from the jury box, it biases even those deemed fit to serve who
have predispositions to convict and believe the state’s case. Haney’s research using simulated
voir dire led him to conclude that, “Subjects who were exposed to death qualification were
significantly more conviction prone, more likely to believe that other trial participants thought
the defendant was guilty, were more likely to sentence him to death, and believed that the law
62
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disapproves of death penalty opposition.”65 This system of qualification biases jurors, who are
already open to the death penalty, to assume a defendant is guilty since death is apparently on the
table, and it affirms their views on the death penalty as they gain jury seating while those with
opposing views are dismissed. This process of death qualification further anchors the likelihood
the state’s interests will be carried out over the rights and protections reserved to capital
defendants.
In addition to the impartiality of the jury, death qualification fails to deliver fair racial
representation in the composition of juries. In measuring the strike rate under Witherspoon in
eleven capital trials in Louisiana with death verdicts between 2009 and 2013, Cover found that
22.5 percent of the jury pool were struck based on their death penalty views and “one- third of
black venire members were struck under Witherspoon, and nearly sixty percent of those struck
on this basis were black.”66 Examining the pool of excluded jurors compared with the entire pool
demographics revealed the average of excluded whites was 38.7 percent and 59.8 percent of
excluded blacks while the venires were 55.8 percent white and 41.6 percent black overall.67 On
average, twice the percentage of blacks in the total jury pool (35.2 percent) compared to the
percentage of whites (17.0 percent) were excluded for their death penalty beliefs. 68 Lynch
established that even in communities with strong African American representation the process of
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death qualification leads to underrepresentation of African Americans on juries. 69 Not only does
death qualification limit the capacity for representative juries and negate chances for diversity
reflecting the community in which a crime may have been committed, Levinson found that,
“Death-qualified jurors hold stronger implicit and self-reported biases than do jury-eligible
citizens generally.”70 Death qualification both bars blacks from serving on capital juries and ends
with jurors who are more biased against minorities than the average eligible juror.
Death qualification has severe implications for convening a representative jury. In
examining death qualification’s impacts on race and juries, Sullivan concluded, “The
demographic consequence of death qualification is the legitimization of a process in which the
need for expression of community attitudes on the suitability of capital punishment is
compromised by limitations in defining the community through the lens of race and ethnicity.”71
Since death-qualified juries are more white, male, and conservative than other juries, the issue of
representation will continue to worsen as minorities grow into majorities and the sector of the
population eligible for death penalty juries will continue to diminish. 72 Various studies have
outlined additional demographic implications of death qualification including Catholics,
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nonfundamentalists, “people who do not interpret the Bible literally, and those who engage in
more devotional religious practices” being highly likely to be removed from capital jury pools. 73
Others have highlighted “higher levels of homophobia, modern racism and modern sexism”
among death-qualified jurors,74 and increased likelihoods to hold views including a just world
and legal authoritarianism, possess an internal locus of control, and affirm aggravating factors. 75
Butler and Moran examined the impact of pretrial publicity on potential jurors and found that,
“Death‐qualified participants were better able to correctly identify the defendant, recognize most
of the factual details of the case,… [and be] more likely to feel that the pretrial publicity
surrounding the case would have minimal impact on the defendant's right to due process.” 76
Butler’s research showed that death-qualified jurors and excludable jurors were equally likely to
spot and recognize incorrect scientific procedures in testimony; however, death-qualified jurors
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were less likely to employ such knowledge when considering the quality and legitimacy of such
evidence.77
The mountain of research and studies over the impact of death qualification and the
demographics of death-qualified jurors point toward significant tapering of the jury-eligible
citizenry toward a selection inherently biased against the interests of capital defendants. It is
clear that death qualification substantially impacts both the composition and verdicts of capital
juries. Certainly, the system by which capital juries are assembled deserves a re-evaluation in
light of its impacts on juries across the United States.
Chapter 3: Reimagining Capital Juries
After reviewing the history, purpose, impact, and outcomes of death qualification, an
imperative challenge arises for any who wish to not only improve the American legal system and
approach to the gravest judgement in the land, but also to defend and uphold the rights promised
and guaranteed to capital defendants under the Constitution. Advocates have advanced varied
approaches from abolishing the practice of death qualification to improving voir dire and even
informing juries of their right of nullification. It is clear that either transformation or annulment
of this process is necessary.
As the death penalty defines one of the most authoritative powers, it therefore requires
equally strong protections in place to guard rogue and imprudent wielding of such force by the
state. One could argue juries function as one such protection. How could twelve individual
jurors, community peers of a defendant, wrongly sentence him in light of the potential for such a
harsh penalty, the ultimate penalty? As laid out, in what should be the most protected, careful
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trial and jury selection, death penalty juries can be the most biased, unrepresentative juries of
them all. So, the question remains, what can be done against such odds?
One possible remedy to the effects of death qualification may lie in the increased
awareness and utilization of jury nullification. As discussed previously, nullification functions as
an essential check to state power and interests. Some suggest adding to jury instructions and
allowing judges to inform juries, with caution, of their right to refuse to follow the instructions of
the law in the extraordinary case it offends their sense of justice. 78 Such an instruction may aid in
advancing true deliberation among jurors over a verdict rather than confusion or bad
assumptions.79 Arguing that this recommendation is unlikely to materialize, Rubenstien
encourages courts not to inform juries of or discourage them against nullification; instead, he
suggests they be told their duty of fact finding and applying the law to the facts but not be
instructed to disregard their sense of morality in the process where the law runs against it. 80 This
process would likely prove easier to enact as it functions as deletion rather than addition to the
process as in the former offer. McKnight offers a similar suggestion, “Judges should instruct
petite juries that if the prosecutor has proven his case beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may
convict the defendant—as opposed to an instruction that in such cases the jury must or should
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convict.”81 A small wording adjustment to jury instructions could prove influential in jurors’
deliberations and understanding of their duty.
Other recommendations include utilizing one jury for the guilt phase and, if necessary,
impaneling a new jury that is death-qualified for the sentencing phase. 82 However, such a process
would likely bias the new jury against a defendant because of the established conviction and new
jurors would not retain any residual doubts from the guilt phase or knowledge of the evidence
presented.83 Salgado advocates a slightly different approach where a jury undergoes death
qualification voir dire but excludable jurors are not removed until after the guilt phase if a
sentencing phase proves necessary; a maximum number of alternates would be retained
throughout the jury and before the sentencing phase excludable jurors would then be removed
from the jury.84
Another suggestion for improvement to the death qualification system is to change the
questions asked during voir dire used to death qualify jurors. Rozelle contends that under the
Witt standard only one question asking whether jurors have “such strong feelings about the death
penalty one way or the other that they would not be able to obey their instructions and oath” is
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necessary.85 She argues that this question alone can satisfy the requirements under Witt in order
to determine whether or not a juror is fit to serve on a capital case and that any additional
examination of a juror’s views infringes on the rights of capital defendants. 86 Changing the
process of death qualification voir dire could increase the percentage of the community deemed
fit to serve and still fall under the rules of the Witt standard.
Stepping away from an improvement approach, others argue that the best and only way to
guard against the detrimental impacts of death qualification is abolishment of the process
altogether. Haney notes, “The problems created by exposure to the process itself cannot be
entirely remedied by anything less than prohibiting the procedure.” 87 Some offer that excluding
the process of death qualification from the trial process altogether may be the only way to ensure
the rights of capital defendants enshrined within the Constitution are protected and ensured.
Ultimately, whether by transformation or annulment, it is abundantly clear that the process of
death qualification is in dire need of change, not only for the process itself, but especially for
those facing the severest of punishments under the American legal system. For a system built on
the pursuit of justice and equality under the law, it is essential we strive to maintain these values
at all levels of the system, no matter how heinous the crime one is charged with or how clear the
evidence is stacked up against them. True justice for all must prevail.
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Conclusion
While the use of the death penalty in America is itself a hotly contested issue, one of the
most concerning issues within its use is the process of death qualification. This process creates
juries that are unrepresentative of their communities and more prone to convict defendants.
Death-qualified juries are the embodiments of a select group of the public rather than the
“conscience of the community” as held in Witherspoon. Death qualification creates a system
inherently biased against those charged at the highest level permissible.
Either the transformation of this practice or termination of its employment under the
American legal system is imperative to retaining the system’s legitimacy and the ideals
established in the Constitution. Death qualification raises flags that must be addressed in order to
retain the original intent and purpose of juries in the United States. It remains to be determined
what method or solution will best serve the balance between the state’s and defendants’ interest.
Ultimately, can juries be believed to come to the best conclusion and form of justice
possible? Or should the system predetermine their choice and force them to make the decision in
order to rid itself of the blame? Is it truly worth restraining the “conscience of the community” in
order to maintain a law of death? The death knell of death qualification hinges on the answer.
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Worldview Appendix
I felt inclined to research this topic and area of the criminal justice system because I
believe how we treat “the least of these” as Christ outlines in Matthew 25:40, “Truly I tell you,
whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me,” referring to the
hungry, thirsty, naked, sick, and imprisoned, defines who we are as a society. Jesus clearly
identifies Himself not with the rich ruler of the day, much less the religious leader; rather, He
casts his lot with that of the naked, the prisoner, the sick, the one in need, shattering every
preconception a reasonable person might hold about the king of the universe. While on earth,
Jesus sought out the fringes of society, whether forgotten, despised, or both. He ate with tax
collectors, healed lepers, and freed the demon-possessed. The life and ministry of Jesus screams
the message that no one is beyond God’s reach, no matter their transgressions or societal rank.
This tenet of the faith must permeate our views and actions as Christians as we seek to follow
Jesus’ example here on earth.
The application of this doctrine most certainly can and should be enshrined in how we
treat those society marginalizes and disregards. To me, there is no clearer place to start than the
criminal justice system. How we treat the accused, the systems we utilize in the pursuit of
“justice” for all, the manner by which we decide the fate of those charged, all should be informed
by a healthy view of our common humanity, shared dignity, and equal worth. By learning more
about the issues that plague the system, dismantle the rights of the accused, and encourage
convictions by juries, it is strikingly obvious that this system desperately needs rectification if
our goal is a system informed by the Gospel and its doctrines. Even if the goal is a secular
system, one can argue that values of equal worth and dignity and a vested interest in the rights
and status of the accused and marginalized also prove beneficial in pursuit of such a system.
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Exploring the process, history, and impacts of death qualification revealed an area of law and of
the judicial system that appears severely adrift of the value of justice, the presumption of
innocence, and a Christian approach to care and regard for the oppressed and marginalized.
As Christians, we should be vigilant to the dangers and threats to the most vulnerable in
our society just as Jesus was. When society’s rules and systems hurt the marginalized and
disregarded, we must not fail to step up and speak out. Bringing peace and healing to any place
of hurt or need ought to be our calling card as Christians. This is our charge—to bring hope and
healing to a world desperately in need of Jesus. May our eyes not be so fixed on a future eternity
that we fail to see a broken, hurting world in front of our very eyes.

